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Galen argues that the Stoic view that children are immediately familiar with what is good is 
false. Chrysippus holds that when a person acts badly, this is so because her nature has been 
perverted, and that the cause of perversion (διαστροφή) is twofold: the influence of the 
companions and what derives «from the very nature of things». Children, Galen contends, rush 
towards pleasure and avoid pain without any instruction. Additionally, they become angry, 
which proves that the first natural thing is not a propensity to what is good, but to emotions. 
However, Galen grants that, although at the beginning children are familiar with pleasure and 
victory, when they grow up, they have a natural familiarization with the good. In this paper I 
argue that the Stoics have a reasonable way of replying to Galen’s objection: since he admits that 
when human beings develop their rationality, a familiarization with the good comes about (such 
familiarization to the good being something natural), he implicitly grants that the inclination to 
the good is part of human nature. In my discussion I briefly deal with the first orientation of the 
human animal towards himself, and suggest that this is the first good; in fact, for animals the 
appropriate thing to do is to pursue the primary natural goods that guarantee the preservation 
of their own constitution. That initial good is not yet a moral good, but it is a necessary condition 
for the correct development of the person, which will foster the correct development of one’s 
inclination towards what is appropriate in a moral sense. 
 
Keywords: Galen, Stoics, perversion, natural good, human animal, ethics 
 
Resumen 
Galeno sostiene que la visión estoica de que los niños están familiarizados inmediatamente 
con lo que es bueno es falsa. Crisipo argumenta que cuando una persona actúa mal es porque su 
naturaleza ha sido pervertida y que la causa de la perversión (διαστροφή) es doble: la influencia 
de los compañeros y lo que se deriva «de la naturaleza misma de las cosas». Los niños, sostiene 
Galeno, se precipitan hacia el placer y evitan el dolor sin ninguna instrucción. Además, se 
enfadan, lo que prueba que lo primero natural no es la propensión a lo bueno, sino a las 
emociones. Sin embargo, Galeno reconoce que, aunque al principio los niños están 
familiarizados con el placer y el deseo de ganar, cuando crecen tienen una familiaridad natural 
con el bien. En este artículo sostengo que los estoicos tienen una forma razonable de responder a 
la objeción de Galeno: dado que él admite que, cuando los seres humanos desarrollan su 
racionalidad, se produce una familiaridad con el bien (siendo dicha familiaridad algo natural), 
implícitamente concede que la inclinación al bien forma parte de la naturaleza humana. En mi 
discusión me ocupo brevemente de la primera orientación del animal humano hacia sí mismo y 
sugiero que éste es el primer bien; de hecho, para los animales lo apropiado es perseguir los bienes 
naturales primarios que garantizan la preservación de su propia constitución. Ese bien inicial 
aún no es un bien moral, pero es una condición necesaria para el correcto desarrollo de la 
persona, es decir de la inclinación hacia lo que es apropiado en el sentido moral. 
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1. Introduction: how good are humans by nature? 
Galen argues that it is not true that children have no natural inclination to pleasure 
and avoidance of pain1. He also notes that it is Chrysippus himself who points out 
that, even when a child has never seen or heard an example of vice, he will not 
necessarily philosophize (PHP V 5, 318, 28-34). What the Stoics are intent on 
endorsing is that humans have from nature inclinations (ἀφορµαί) towards virtue2 
and towards stabilizing their impulses3.  
According to Chrysippus (as reported by Galen), the cause of perversion 
(διαστροφή) is twofold: the first is «the influence of the majority of people»; the 
second arises «from the very nature of things»4, a somehow vague expression that 
Galen rephrases later as «the persuasiveness of the impressions» (τὴν πιθανότητα 
τῶν φαντασιῶν, PHP V 5, 320, 17-18). This fits with the account furnished by 
Diogenes Laertius, who reports that the Stoics maintained that the rational animal at 
times is perverted (διαστρέφεσθαι) by the persuasiveness of exterior things or by the 
influence of companions, while the starting-points provided by nature are supposed 
to be «uncorrupted» (ἀδιαστρόφους)5. But Galen intends to show that, since 
Chrysippus only focused on the best part of the soul (i.e., τὸ λογιστικόν), he is unable 
to explain the origin of vice. Additionally, Galen objects to Chrysippus that, if children 
are from the beginning immediately familiar  (εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾠκείωται) with what 
is good, vice could not arise from causes intrinsic to themselves, but should only come 
from without (PHP 318, 20-30). Moreover, it cannot be said that children’s impulses 
are governed by reason, for they do not have reason yet (PHP 316, 24-25).  
Of particular interest is the fact that Galen challenges the Stoic thesis of 
familiarization (οἰκείωσις), according to which (i) the first impulse of the animal is 
                                               
I am grateful to the editors of this volume, Ermanno Malaspina and Jula Wildberger, for having 
invited me to contribute this piece and for their comments and objections on a previous version. Their 
suggestions helped me improve the  structure of my paper. I also thank the anonymous reviewers of the 
journal Pegé / Fons for helpful remarks. This is a partial result of the Fondecyt Project 1200213 (Chile). 
1 Galen, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (PHP), V 5, 316, 28-320, 28, ed. De Lacy.  
2 Stob. II 7, 5b8 (II, 65, 8-9, ed. Wachsmuth). The view that human beings have a natural tendency 
towards what is good is also reported by other sources (Calcidius, In Tim. chap. 165; SVF III, 229. 
Musonius Rufus, Diss. 3, p. 9, 15-9, 16, ed. Hense). Seneca states that the well born is the person «well set 
up by nature for virtue» (Ep. 44, 5). Of course, this does not mean that virtue is given without qualification; 
as warned by Seneca, virtue will not simply descend on oneself and is not discovered by trivial work or a 
small effort (Ep. 76, 6). In Seneca’s Ep. 120 the main subject of discussion is how humans have acquired 
the knowledge of good and evil (for discussion see HADOT, 2014, 15 ff. and GLOYN, 2014, 239 n. 19). 
See also Cic. Fin. III 23; he maintains that, even though all due acts (officia) originate from nature’s 
principles and we are commended (commendari) to wisdom by the starting-points of nature (ab initiis 
naturae), one gets perfect rationality only over time. 
3 The technical Stoic term normally associated with the animal’s inclination to what is good 
(ἀφορµή) also explains that Panaetius has claimed that the goal is living according to the ἀφορµαί given 
to us by nature (cf. Clem. Alex., Stromateis II 21, 129, 4). 
4 Gal. PHP V 4, 320, 1-2. On this see TIELEMAN (2003), 132-139; GILL (2006), 257-258, 385. 
Seneca renders διαστροφή by perversitas (Ep. 95, 34; also, pravitas, Ep. 50, 4; 122, 5). For discussion 
see BERNO (2014), 371-372; 378-379. 
5 D.L. VII 89. See also Cic. Fin. III 22-23. 
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not pleasure, but self-preservation and (ii) there is a natural orientation towards what 
is good. Galen denies (i) because children rush towards pleasure and avoid pain 
without any instruction. 
Within the framework of his argument, the restriction «without instruction» 
(ἀδιδάκτως) is relevant since, in case there was instruction, one could argue that this 
inclination to pleasure is due to instruction, not to nature. But the fact is, Galen 
maintains, that there is no ‘didactic training’ responsible for that orientation towards 
pleasure.   
He insists that thesis (ii) should also be rejected because in fact children get angry, 
which proves that the first impulse (D.L. VII 85: πρώτη ὁρµή) is not a propensity to 
good, but to passionate states (a detail that is observed not only in children but also in 
irrational animals)6. However, Galen grants that, although at first children are 
familiar with pleasure and victory, on reaching maturity, they have a certain natural 
familiarization (τινὰ φυσικὴν οἰκείωσιν) with the good (καλόν). Now, young 
children are rational, even though they are not rational yet in the sense that they can 
use their reason properly. Moreover, if at the beginning of a newborn’s life the leading 
part of its soul is like a sheet of paper ready for being written upon7, one should assume 
that newborns have no concepts of what is good or bad yet, so that their souls cannot 
be perverted.  
There has been a great deal of discussion about the issues treated in this paper. The 
central problem is the development of character. As suggested by Christopher Gill, a 
good starting-point is Cicero, who states that the first appropriate act (officium) is the 
animal’s self-preservation in its natural constitution; the second is that the animal 
retains the things according to nature and rejects the ones contrary to nature (Cic. Fin. 
III 43 and V 24; 43). This process is described as a sort of necessary condition to grasp 
what is good: once this natural procedure of selection and rejection has been 
discovered, what can be truly called ‘good’ appears to the agent. This process depicts 
«an ideal pattern of development», which can culminate in virtue (but a succesful 
culmination of this process requires the presence of a developed rationality)8. The 
development of one’s character can be analyzed according to different levels; the first 
is that of ‘primary natural things’, objects towards which animals are instictively 
attracted in the initial stage of their development. This being so, one should assume 
that the goodness a human being is inclined to by nature is its own self-preservation 
(or so I shall argue). Pursuing the primary natural things is an appropriate act for any 
animal. Now, if those primary natural things are pursued rationally, the appropriate 
act achieves what is suitable for the human constitution9. It is true that at the outset 
                                               
6 Galen probably draws on Pl. R. IV 441a 8-9. 
7 Aëtius IV 11, 1-5 (Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Doctrines of the Philosophers, 900a-d). 
8 GILL (2006), 129-130. 
9 This, as emphasized by GILL (2006), 131, does not yet constitute virtue. In order to reach virtue, 
one must be able to attain a complete understanding of the good and that only can be acquired once 
one’s reason has been (correctly) developed (GILL, 2006, 133). 
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of the human animal’s life the orientation to its constitution (understood as a sense of 
appropriation of what allows oneself to function correctly) and the preference for 
those things that permit self-preservation are good for that purpose alone10. Never-
theless, this basic good can be considered a necessary condition for the correct 
development of the person, which will foster the correct development of our 
inclination towards what is approriate in a moral sense. In Fin. V 43 Cicero argues 
that nature generated the vis hominis to enable us to acquire any virtue, which 
explains why young children without instruction are stirred by resemblances of the 
virtues containing within themselves «the seeds of virtues»11.  
Graver, for her part, provides a detailed reconstruction of the whole process of 
character formation according to the Stoics. First, she contends, one’s character and 
behavior are not caused by forces beyond one’s control. We are responsible for 
forming the beliefs and habits we have, but again, one might suspect that this is 
possible once one’s reason has been developed or during the very process of 
developing one’s rationality. According to Graver, «Stoic providentialism asserts that 
the mind is geared towards the acquisition of correct knowledge throughout one’s 
life»12. But as she clarifies, we are not born with knowledge, although we have innate 
tendencies which give us some guidance for a correct intellectual development; the 
kind of innatism related to these inclinations, I hold, should be understood as a 
dispositional innateness (i.e. the innate capacity to correctly develop one’s character 
in the direction of knowledge rather than of error)13. Despite providence’s beneficent 
plan, Graver underlines, we acquire many erroneous beliefs. In that process, «the 
persuasiveness of impressions» plays a decisive role, although the most interesting 
point in Graver’s argument is the emphasis she places upon the fact that the native 
tendencies must be very closely allied with the points of view of nature14.   
In this article I argue that the Stoics have a reasonable way of replying to Galen’s 
objection: since Galen admits that when a human being develops his rationality, a 
familiarization to the good comes about  (such familiarization to the good being 
something natural), he is implicitly granting that the inclination to good is part of 
human nature. In fact, as soon as we are born, the Stoics claim, we are familiarized 
                                               
10 GRAVER (2007), 152. 
11 See Cic. Tusc. III 2, where he stresses that «seeds of virtues» are inborn (semina innata virtutum) 
in our characters (see Sen. Ep. 120, 4: semen scientiae). Fin. V is not supposed to report Stoic doctrine, 
but this assertion is unquestionably Stoic. Moreover, according to Cic. Leg. I 44, nature has given us a 
kind of common understanding (communis intellegentia), so that we are able to identify the noble 
(honesta) with virtue and what is disgraceful (turpia) with vice. This ‘intelligence’ or understanding, 
«sketched or imperfect» (inchoata) is straightforwardly related to the Stoic thesis, attested by Seneca (Ep. 
49, 11-12; 120, 30), that nature has not given us the concept or knowledge of righteousness, but rather 
«seeds of that knowledge» (the same idea can be found in Musonius Rufus, Diss. II, p. 6, 5 ff.; p. 7, 12 
ff. ed. Hense). As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, in Roman philosophy the term semen is the 
original element (starting with Lucretius: semina rerum are the atoms). So, maybe Cicero applies a 
Lucretian (physical) lexicon to an epistemological context. 
12 GRAVER (2007), 149-150. 
13 GRAVER (2007), 175. 
14 GRAVER (2007), 153. 
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with what is naturally good for us and alienated from what is naturally bad15. The 
prescriptions that come from reason are part of human nature, and it is thanks to 
those prescriptions that a human being can recognize errors, vindicate virtues and 
carry out actions in accordance with these virtues. I shall briefly treat the first 
orientation of the human animal towards self-preservation - which at the beginning 
of the animal’s life can be understood as a selfish feeling, but later can become an 
‘altruistic’ feeling that is directed not only at one’s own interest but also at the interest 
of the others. While discussing the issue of an animal’s attachment to itself, I will 
suggest that this is the first good (both for human and non-human animals); for 
animals the appropriate path is to pursue primary natural goods that guarantee the 
preservation of their own constitution. As stated above, even though self-preservation 
can be taken to be the first good to which a newborn is inclined, that initial good is 
not yet a moral good, though it is a necessary condition for the correct development 
of the person, which will foster the correct development of our inclination towards 
what is appropriate in a moral sense.  
My paper proceeds thus: in the next section (2) I contrast the Epicurean and Stoic 
view regarding what the newborn animal’s object of desire is and emphasize the Stoic 
arguments against pleasure as that to which the just born animal is oriented. At this 
point I return to Galen’s evaluation of the Stoics and show that he endorses the 
Epicurean view. In treating this, I present the Stoic arguments against Epicureanism 
as reported by Cicero, Seneca, and Diogenes Laertius to explain the sense in which I 
take self-preservation to be the first good towards which the human animal is directed. 
Next (3), I examine the presumably unperverted nature of the newborn before it is 
corrupted, and insist that the fact that the knowledge the human animal has of what 
is good in its first stages, even though it is a certain kind of knowledge, cannot qualify 
as a ‘real good’ in the sense of what is morally good. I also attempt to make plausible 
the idea that the animal’s good in terms of what is convenient for its preservation and 
the good in a moral sense are somehow related. In 4 I explain the issue of the 
«persuasiveness of impressions» and provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Epicureans and the Stoics on newborn animals’ first object of desire 
Cicero (Fin. I 29-31) famously reports that, according to the Epicureans, as soon 
as each animal is born, it seeks pleasure as the highest good (ut summo bono) and 
rejects pain as the greatest evil (ut summum malum). The animal does this while it is 
still uncorrupted (ipsa natura incorrupte) and sound. By contrast, the Stoics, probably 
bearing this Epicurean account in mind, argue that as soon as the animal is born, it 
strives for its self-preservation. Both Epicureans and Stoics think that at some point 
nature is perverted. The fact is that, for the most part, human beings live their lives 
having their nature perverted, since perversion of nature arrives very soon in a 
person’s life. Irrational animals are the only animals that live their lives with their 
                                               
15 See ANNAS (1993), 148. 
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nature unperverted, and this is so because they have no practical life in the strict sense. 
In other words, they do not have the sort of life which is supposed to deal with what 
is bad and good in a moral evaluative sense for a rational being. If a practical life is 
related to a life where what is bad and good is relevant, non-human animals do not 
qualify as a type of individual whose nature can be perverted or modified in 
evaluative terms vis-a-vis what is morally incorrect. The basic assumption (both for 
Epicureans and Stoics) is that nature in its origin always is good and it can be a sort 
of pattern for what is good and bad.  
Turning now to the objection Galen presents against the Stoic tenet that children 
have no natural inclination to pleasure, we see that he sides with the Epicureans (i.e., 
their view that the animal, including the human animal, seeks pleasure and avoids 
pain). Casting doubt on the Stoic view, Galen implies that human nature is not 
naturally good, thus implicitly opposing the stance that one’s (still unperverted) 
nature can be a pattern of what is good or bad. The Stoic arguments against the 
Epicurean view that animals have a natural inclination to pleasure and avoidance of 
pain are well reported by Diogenes Laertius, Seneca, and Hierocles16. D.L. VII 85 
probably provides the most clear and complete argument, usually ascribed to 
Chrysippus; at this point, my hunch is that the other Stoics are drawing on 
Chrysippus’ argument (i.e. Musonius, Seneca, Hierocles and Cicero when reporting 
the Stoic view). In what follows I will present those arguments and contrast them with 
Galen’s view. 
The Platonic Eudoxus had already suggested before Epicurus that pleasure is that 
which, without question, human beings and all other animals pursue17. Epicurus went 
even further: he tried to show that pleasure is the only natural end by arguing that 
newborns, who are still free from any destructive influence of their own nature, direct 
their first impulse towards pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not only a starting point, 
but also a final end18. The Stoics, for their part, denied that the first natural impulse 
was towards pleasure, or that pleasure is the final end of human life; the primary 
impulse of the animal is towards its own self-preservation19. Chrysippus’ argument 
runs thus20: (a) the first thing one is familiarized with is both one’s own constitution 
                                               
16 Even Musonius Rufus provides an argument against the view that the first impulse is towards 
pleasure (Diss. XXIV).  
17 See Arist. EN X 1, 1172b 9-10 and, before him, Pl. Phlb. 11b, when he presents the view of crude 
hedonism. 
18 On this, see Sextus Empiricus, PH III 194 (Usener 398); see also Cic. Fin. I 29-31. 
19 A similar idea can be found in Musonius Rufus (Diss. XVII, p. 89, 5-8, ed. Hense). But see D.L. 
VII 148, where several Stoic philosophers (including Chrysippus, Posidonius, Antipater and Boethus) 
are said to have suggested that nature aims both at what is advantageous and at pleasure (τοῦ 
συµφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς), and that this is obvious from human artisan activity (ἐκ τῆς 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δηµιουργίας). As LONG-SEDLEY (1987), II, 264-265 observe, there is no other evidence 
that fully confirms or explains this claim, and with some doubt they suggest interpreting the word ἡδονή 
as a very general term for «gratification» or «contentment». Although this suggestion sounds attractive, 
it does not solve the issue. 
20 For the sake of my purpose here, I just present the argument in a very schematic way; for detailed 
discussion of this passage see INWOOD (1985), 184-194 (who, in my view, provides the clearest discussion 
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(σύστασις; i.e. physical constitution) and the awareness (συνείδησις) of it. Since 
nature familiarizes the animal with itself from the beginning of its life, its first impulse 
is directed towards its own preservation (ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό). (b) Then a teleological 
explanation is introduced: nature has produced the animal and could have made it 
(b.1) alien to itself, (b.2) neither alien to nor familiar with itself, or (b.3) familiar with 
itself. The alternatives (b.1) and (b.2) are dismissed; in fact, it is not plausible to think 
that nature, after having produced an animal, would not have provided it with the 
necessary means for its self-preservation. If so, one might wonder for which sake 
nature produced the animal. Amid the teleological argument positing nature as the 
cause of familiarization, the objection to the Epicurean thesis is introduced: (c) 
pleasure only appears once nature seeks and obtains what fits the constitution of the 
animal. This being so, pleasure is only a byproduct (ἐπιγέννηµα)21 and presupposes 
the familiarization of the living being to itself. The Stoics denied that the initial stage 
in the development of the animal was a natural impulse towards pleasure because the 
tendency to self-preservation is prior to pleasure.  
Both Cicero and Seneca offer two interesting arguments to show this: before 
feeling pleasure or pain the newborns (parvi) want what provides them a certain 
welfare and reject the opposite. However, this can only happen if, as a prior fact, the 
animal is able to appreciate its own condition and fear its destruction. But one cannot 
desire something unless one has self-awareness, from which it follows that self-
awareness is prior to pleasure as the object towards which the animal is oriented (Fin. 
III 16-18, 20; SVF III, 182, 189). Indeed, the animal tends toward pleasure at any 
time, but feeling pleasure for something presupposes having a certain awareness 
(sensus) of oneself. 
For his part, Seneca contends that all living beings have a perception of their own 
condition; that is obvious from the way animals move their limbs «neatly and nimbly 
just as if they were trained for this» (transl. E. Fantham). No living being moves its 
own limbs with difficulty; so, since all living creatures do this as soon as they are born, 
it should be inferred that they ‘arrive at the world’ endowed with this knowledge (as 
if they were born trained). Someone might object that animals move their parts neatly 
                                               
of the issue). See also ANNAS (1993), 263-267; COOPER (1999), 434-444; KÜHN (2011), 270-279. 
Interestingly IOPPOLO (2013), 175, notes that if the distortion of reason is a moral-psychological process 
(«un processo psicologico morale»), the representations that arouse passions must have as their object 
good or evil. From birth, Ioppolo holds, the child associates the concept of good with the representation 
that comes from healthy and useful things for its preservation. The problem with this view is that 
newborns do not have concepts yet.  
21 Clement, apparently evoking a Stoic view, points out that «the sensation of pleasure» (τὸ τῆς 
ἡδονῆς πάθος) is not at all a necessity (καθόλου ... οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον), but «the accompaniment of certain 
natural needs» (ἐπακολούθηµα δὲ χρείαις τισὶ φυσικαῖς), such as hunger, thirst, cold, marriage (this 
last «natural need» must be taken for granted to beget children; see Strom. II 20, 118, 7-119, 3; SVF III, 
405). Pleasure has been introduced into life as a sort of «auxiliary» (ὑπουργία), but it is neither an 
activity (ἐνέργεια), nor a disposition (διάθεσις), nor any part of us. The most important philosophical 
antecedent regarding the fact that pleasure is a certain kind of ἐπιγέννηµα is Aristotle, who argues that 
«pleasure completes the activity not as the inherent state (ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα) does but as an end 
which supervenes» (ὡς ἐπιγινόµενόν τι τέλος, EN X 4, 1174b 32-33, transl. Barnes-Kenny). 
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because if they moved differently, they would feel pain. This being so, it is fear, not 
will, what moves them in the right way. Nevertheless, the Stoic takes this to be false, 
since actions performed by necessity are slow, while the agility demonstrated by 
animals comes from voluntary movement. Furthermore, animals strive to achieve 
their natural movement even when pain prevents them. Therefore, it is not fear that 
guides an animal’s movement, but a sort of ‘implicit knowledge’ that, even in a pre-
intellectual sense, allows it to be aware of its parts and functions. It is not the fear of 
pain that drives the animal because, even when pain is presented as an impediment, 
the animal strives to develop its natural movement (Ep. 121, 5-8). This positively 
shows, Seneca concludes, that the animal is not primarily pleasure-oriented; in fact, it 
carries out actions that involve pain (trying to stand, e.g., the infant falls and rises 
again and again while crying), but it is through pain that the infant manages to 
achieve a degree of training that implements what its own nature demands of itself 
(standing up). It is not true, therefore, that the animal is primarily oriented toward 
pleasure from the beginning of its life: there are cases in which pain can accompany 
fitting training to perform what is naturally appropriate. 
Both Cicero and Seneca clearly favor the priority of the animal’s interest in itself, 
not pleasure; both pleasure and pain stem from familiarization (οἰκείωσις), 
understood both as a sort of self-preservation and self-recognition. Self-recognition 
seems to precede pleasure (in several senses: logically, causally and temporally), since 
before recognizing one’s bodily self, one cannot know what gratifies or pleases oneself. 
Hence pleasure cannot be the primary impulse of the living being because it is 
something derived and therefore a byproduct.  
Such recognition surely starts with the awareness of one’s own constitution, which 
would facilitate control of one’s own parts. However, this awareness does not mean 
that the individual has an intellectual understanding; when one objects to the Stoic 
view, asking how it is possible for a baby to understand such an intricate question, 
Seneca replies that what he argues for is not that the newborn understands a definition 
of its constitution, or that it knows in conceptual terms what its physical constitution 
is, but that it knows its constitution nevertheless. Indeed, an individual can tend 
towards what is good without being able to conceptualize the notion of good. It is a 
form of ‘pre-intellectual understanding’ that the animal has of its limbs insofar as it 
«knows» their functions (Ep. 121, 10-12)22. 
 
3. The movement from the unperverted to perverted nature 
If Seneca is to be trusted, in its first stages of development the human animal has 
a «certain kind of knowledge», as it were, such «knowledge» being a cognizance of 
what is convenient or good for its own survival. It is clear that this good does not 
qualify as a ‘moral good’. Against the Stoics (and in line with the Epicureans) Galen 
                                               
22 Furthermore, probably one should not be so demanding with the Stoics; if Cicero is right, what 
nature has in fact given us are only the «tiniest sparks of understanding» (parvulos nobis dedit igniculos). 
We are corrupted by our wrongful habits and beliefs (Tusc. III 2). 
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states that all children rush into pleasures and flee from pains untaught. In fact, he 
contends, they not only become angry, but they also kick and annoy, so young 
children have emotions and their first impulse is pleasure23. This behavior is also 
noted, Galen remarks, in non-human animals (such as quails, roosters, and 
«thousands of other animals»). This shows, Galen insists, that children seem to be 
familiar both with pleasure and victory, and when they grow in age, they have a 
natural familiarization with what is noble. Thus, Galen’s reasoning attempts to make 
clear that familiarization, even though a natural phenomenon, is posterior to the 
natural inclination of the newborn to pleasure. As Galen wisely points out, it is true 
that as children get older, they carry out many actions in accordance with their 
concepts of those virtues (κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀρετῶν τούτων ἐννοίας). When they were 
young children, though, they lived immersed in their emotional states, without 
worrying about the prescriptions that came from reason.  
A Stoic, I claim, would have a plausible reply to Galen’s reasoning: (i) If 
Chrysippus and Seneca could answer Galen, they would use the argument they 
actually employ against the Epicureans to reject the view that the animal’s first 
impulse is aimed at pleasure (it is interesting to note that Galen keeps silent regarding 
those argumentative devices); (ii) if Galen acknowledges that familiarization is a 
natural phenomenon, he also should recognize that the inclination to good is natural 
in a human being. Of course, Galen is very careful to avoid associating familiarization 
with the issue of self-preservation, which is the core of the Stoic argument in the 
already commented-on passages by Diogenes Laertius (reporting Chrysippus’ view), 
Cicero and Seneca. But if he accepts that humans can have a natural familiarization 
with what is noble, he needs to explain why this appears when reason manifests itself, 
not when reason is just a capacity that needs to be activated. Galen can reply that this 
cannot take place before reason is developed because without rationality there cannot 
be a concept of just or good. Even admitting this objection, a Stoic, notwithstanding, 
could say that for the animal to be familiar with itself (that is, for familiarization to 
take place in the basic, though no less important, sense of self-recognition) it is not 
necessary to be in possession of developed reason. In fact, this is an important detail 
in Seneca’s argument. The usual objection, Seneca recalls, is that an infant cannot 
comprehend this complicated matter, and if it were true, all animals should be born 
(as) logicians (dialectica nasci oportet) in order to understand the definition of 
«constitution» (ut ... istam finitionem ... intellegant). Of course, babies cannot 
understand the definition of their constitution: «Nature is more easily understood 
than explained» (Ep. 121, 11; transl. B. Inwood), However, they can know their 
constitution insofar as they are aware of it. (iii) The interesting point addressed by 
Galen is the idea that when children become older and can express themselves better, 
                                               
23 See Gal. PHP 316, 28-320, 28 (SVF III, 229a). This can be taken as part of Galen’s argument 
against the Stoic view that an emotion is just one’s reason disposed in a certain way: since children do 
not have reason yet (i.e. they do not have developed their reason), and in fact they have emotions, an 
emotion cannot be reason. 
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they can perform many actions following their concepts of those virtues. Of course, 
when children grow up and their rational capacities are developed, they are already 
capable of conceptualizing what is right and wrong. My point is that, even though 
the Stoics claim that nature provides us with unperverted starting points, they do not 
say that we are born having the clear notion of what is just or good. That is why it 
seems reasonable to assume that the first impulse aimed at self-preservation can be 
taken to be aimed at a certain kind of pre-intellectual good, which is a necessary 
condition for the person’s character formation anyway in the process that eventually 
can culminate in the correct development of rationality.  
The psychological Platonic view endorsed by Galen shows why he was puzzled 
(ἀπορεῖ) when trying to explain the origin of vice, and was unable to find out how 
children are wrong (ἁµαρτάνει). This passage (where Posidonius’ position about 
οἰκείωσις is supposed to be presented) is useful to show that Galen’s views on moral 
psychology presuppose the Platonic tripartition of the soul (i.e. a psychology that is 
alien to the monistic psychology of the older Stoics). In the last three decades or so, 
several studies have reconsidered the position of Posidonius and have maintained that 
he did not reject the psychological monism of Chrysippus24. This interpretation states 
that in all sources - with the exception of Galen - Posidonius seems to have always 
been considered an ‘orthodox Stoic’ in moral psychology. The problem in this case is 
that Galen is, most likely, the main source for reconstructing Chrysippus’ and 
Posidonius’ stances on moral psychology, and what Galen informs us of it is that 
Chrysippus held a (in his opinion counterintuitive) monist view that does not admit 
parts in conflict25. Indeed, Posidonius thought that Zeno and, above all, Cleanthes 
defended a psychological model based on the partition of the soul; according to Galen, 
Cleanthes describes the soul as an entity with two conflicting factors: λογισµός and 
θυµός26. In any case, if Galen would not ascribe to Posidonius a tripartite psychology 
(which he approves), his objection to Chrysippus regarding the Stoic inability to 
explain the origin of vice could not be understood.  
The Stoic good understood in terms of what is convenient for the living being at 
the first stage of its life and the good in a moral sense are somehow related: if the 
human animal is not able to preserve itself, it cannot develop a flourishing life in moral 
terms. This is the way that the awareness the human animal has works as the very 
condition to determine any other posterior good. Human rationality, which is a 
crucial ingredient of human nature, should play a central role in the passage from 
childhood to adulthood. Interestingly, when one’s nature is unperverted, one’s reason 
                                               
24 See especially FILLION-LAHILLE (1984), 122-123, 153; GILL (1998) and COOPER (1999), 451-
455, 467-468. 
25 In Galen’s view, Posidonius endorses a more reasonable tripartite position (see Clem. Strom. II 2, 
129, 4). Despite the sophisticated arguments offered by the scholars just mentioned, I still believe that 
Posidonius must have defended a tripartite psychology (if it were not so, the three types of οἰκείωσις 
distinguished in this passage would not be understandable; maybe the issue can be solved if, as suggested 
by ISNARDI PARENTE, 1989, 2220, it’s just a division of the faculties of the soul, not of its οὐσία).  
26 For a monistic reading of Cleanthes’ passage, allow me to refer to BOERI (2005), 392-394. 
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is still not activated or developed. Thus, one’s nature starts being perverted when one’s 
reason begins to be developed. This sounds somewhat odd, but in part depends on the 
fact that, for a Stoic, having reason does not guarantee that one already has right 
reason. It depends on oneself to develop one’s reason in the correct way27. 
 
4. The orientation towards what is good and the persuasiveness of impressions.  
Concluding Remarks 
So far, I have argued that, against what Galen seems to assume, the Stoics are not 
stating that young children already have a notion of what is virtuous when asserting 
that infants have a natural orientation towards the good. Galen is right in pointing 
out that, as children grow older, they can carry out virtuous actions following their 
concepts of those virtues. Nevertheless, the Stoics do not imply that a newborn is able 
to do that when they claim that the natural orientation is towards the good. By their 
nature, young children only have the innate capacity to develop right reason, which 
will allow them (at some point during their development) to correctly determine what 
is good. However, according to the Stoics, all humans share a common rational 
background; if this is so, one could wonder how evaluative concepts could mean 
different things to different people. Epictetus’ account can be helpful here: people 
need an education, not in order to teach us what is good and bad, but to teach us to 
apply our preconceptions of rational and irrational (and presumably of what is good 
and bad) to particular cases according to nature (Diss. I 2, 5; II 11, 1-11). Such a 
process of learning to rightly apply (i.e. «according to nature») one’s preconception 
of what is good proves that one’s natural orientation towards good is explained by the 
possession of an innate preconception of what is right28. Thus, what the Stoics mean 
is not that newborns have a real understanding of moral issues, but that until they 
have refined their cognitive abilities, they will not be able to conceptually recognize 
what is truly good and eventually practice it.  
At the outset of this paper I pointed out that the kind of innatism related to natural 
human inclinations towards good should be understood as a dispositional innateness. 
Several sources describe the way in which the Stoics explain how a moral concept 
arises; for the sake of brevity, I will comment on a well-known passage where Cicero 
                                               
27 The distinction between ratio and recta ratio is also stressed by Cic. Leg. I 23 in a supposedly Stoic 
context, where recta ratio becomes the tenet of lex (I owe this reference to an anonymous reviewer). 
28 Regarding concept formation, the Stoic empiricism should deny any form of innatism; for the sake 
of coherence, one might assume, the origin of a concept must be the result of a perceptual impression 
(for this view, see BOERI-SALLES, 2014, 129-131). The issue of preconceptions in Stoicism and how it can 
be said that they are «innate» or «inborn» (Plutarch, De stoic. rep. 1041e-1042a; SVF III, 69: ἔµφυτοι 
προλήψεις) has been widely discussed. In his pioneering book on Epictetus, BONHÖFFER (1890), 193-
203, attempted to show that the Stoic preconceptions do not depend on perceptual experience, since they 
are limited to practical concepts. SANDBACH (1971), 22-23, 35 n. 12, challenges Bonhöffer’s view by 
showing some textual evidence that indicates that any concept depends on experience (in favor of 
Bonhöffer’s interpretation see HADOT, 2014, 10-11, 17, who draws on M. JACKSON-MCCABE, 2004). 
For a fresh discussion of the topic, see SCOTT (1995), 202-204, who defends a dispositional approach to 
Stoic innatism. 
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reports the Stoic account about concept formation (Fin. III 33-34), emphasizing that 
our concept of good arises by a sort of rational inference. In the context, this is 
explained by stating that our mind ‘ascends’ from the things according to nature to 
the notion of good. Now if in order to reach the notion of good, we need a rational 
inference, the awareness of the concept of good should be posterior in the human 
animal’s development, but that does not prevent the person from (i) having an 
inclination to the first appropriate thing (self-preservation, which can be taken to be 
a certain ‘good’ as well) and (ii) having such inclination somehow due to the 
preconception of good, which is a notion implanted in the person by nature. Hence, 
at the initial state of life, one does not need to perform actions following one’s concept 
of what is good (further, the Stoics do not think that newborns ‘perform actions’ in 
the strict sense: insofar as their reason is not developed yet, their condition is not 
different from irrational animals, in which there is not yet a distinction between good 
and bad). An implicit assumption of the whole discussion is that human beings are 
constitutively ‘attracted’ to the good, which does not mean that every human being 
will be a good person from the beginning (or even after the person has achieved 
complete rational development)29. Thus, the fact that one is constitutively attracted 
to the good does not mean that one will carry out good actions immediately after one 
is born; human beings, by the mere fact of being humans, have the capacity to 
theoretically identify what is good (when their rationality is mature), to distinguish it 
from evil, and eventually to apply what the agent takes to be good to action30.  
My final point focuses on «the persuasiveness of impressions», the second cause of 
perversion of one’s nature according to Chrysippus. I propose to explain the 
expression by resorting to Epictetus, who cites it (Diss. II 22, 6: ταράττῃ ... αἱ 
πιθανότητες αὐτῶν) probably with Chrysippus in mind. According to Epictetus, 
the third area of study that philosophy deals with concerns assent (Diss. III 2, 2), and 
while stating that we ought not to accept an impression (which is related to the things 
which are persuasive and attractive: τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ ἑλκυστικά, III 12, 14) without 
examination, he evokes the psychology of action, according to which the assent to a 
certain kind of impression (impulsive impression) produces an impulse which 
culminates in action31. What Epictetus recommends is that one should avoid 
precipitancy while giving assent. However, the fool is incapable of distinguishing 
between good and evil, since by incorrectly using his impressions and incorrectly 
                                               
29 The first and most obvious attraction experienced by the human animal is the instinctive attraction 
in the first stage of its development (self-preservation, a kind of attraction which takes care of one’s 
condition as a psychophysical organism; on this see GILL, 2006, 130).  
30 Once more, Epictetus is helpful to better comprehend this approach: he stresses that the good is 
something innate, and suggests that when there is a «clear impression (or appearance) of the good» 
(ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἐναργῆ, Diss. III 3, 4), the agent cannot do anything else than give his assent, 
which means to assent to the propositional content of the «clear impression of the good».  
31 See Stob. II 7, 9 (SVF  III, 169, 171, 173); on ‘impulsive impression’ as the sort of impression 
whose assent gives rise to an impulse and action cf. also Origen, De principiis III 1, 2, 11-12, and Epictetus, 
Diss. I 1, 12, 2; 21, 2; III 8, 4. 
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distinguishing between them, he is disturbed and overcome by false impressions and 
by their persuasiveness. The immediate effect is that the agent first believes that x is 
good, then that the same x is bad, and later that it is neither the one nor the other 
(Diss. II 22, 6; 25)32. Whoever has his cognitive abilities properly trained, on the other 
hand, will have his character well-disposed and will notice that the good is his own 
choice (or «volition»: προαίρεσις) correctly disposed (Diss. I 8, 16; 29, 1). One will 
have a good life only if one makes correct use of his impressions (a theme on which 
Epictetus frequently insists)33, which is dependent on the agent. Humans cannot 
remove impressions (φαντασίαι), but adult human beings can critically examine 
them, so as to reject those that have not passed the examination of (right) reason. 
Epictetus insists that nature has endowed us with reason to use our impressions 
correctly, which is nothing more than to examine and distinguish between them, and 
not accept any that has not been examined (Diss. I 20, 5-8). External things (τὰ 
ἐκτός) are the materials of our choice, and the only way by which the choice will 
attain what is truly good is not to have a special consideration for such materials: if 
one’s own beliefs (δόγµατα) regarding them are correct, they will make our choice 
good; if perverse or distorted, they will make it evil (Diss. I 29, 2-4). Ultimately, 
individual responsibility lies not in impressions, but in the correct use each of us makes 
of them.  
Finally, if a fool is ignorant, what can be done to be aware of, and eventually 
reverse, that ignorance? If the peculiar task of the good person is to deal properly with 
impressions (i.e. to do what is «according to nature»; Diss. III 3, 1) and if one chooses 
the correct course of action when doing so, whoever makes correct use of impressions 
must already be wise. If this is not the case, one should think that the agent’s own 
evaluation of an impression would necessarily be incorrect. However, when 
something good appears to a person, said good immediately activates the soul towards 
it, while when evil appears, the soul moves away from it, because «a soul will never 
reject a clear impression of good» (Diss. III 3, 4; transl. R. Hard). But, whose soul? If 
Epictetus is thinking of the wise person, there is no problem; but if he thinks that this 
also occurs in the fool’s soul, the account seems implausible. No doubt, one needs to 
have true beliefs in order to be able not to reject a clear impression of good. Perhaps 
Epictetus is only pointing out the natural disposition that rational beings have towards 
good insofar as all rational beings are born with an ‘implanted’ conception of good 
and evil (Diss. II 11, 3-4), hence the agent will be completely rational when she is able 
                                               
32 This is reminiscent of Medea, Chrysippus’ favorite example to account for the weakness of 
character. On this see Gal. PHP  IV 5, 270, 10-24; 272, 9-274, 26 (SVF III, 473); his purpose is to show 
that Chrysippus contradicts himself when he argues that emotions are judgments, for at the same time 
he accepts that although Menelaus had formed his judgement to kill Helena and drew his sword to do 
so, when he approached her, moved by her beauty and «because of the absence of tension and the 
weakness of his soul», he not only got rid of his sword, but kissed the woman and put himself in her 
hands. If this is so, Galen concludes, Chrysippus accepts the existence of a psychological conflict. 
33 See Diss. I 1, 7; 12; I 6, 13. Even ‘the essence’ of the good and the evil depends on the (correct) use 
of impressions (II 1, 4). For discussion, see LONG (2002), 85, 214-217. 
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to recognize what is good, at the theoretical level, and to act well at the practical one. 
Thus, there is an essential relationship between good as an object of impulse and good 
as an object of knowledge; but the impression of a real good, not of an apparent good, 
is the only one capable of setting in motion the correct impulse (which the agent 
translates into a virtuous action). That is why in the virtuous agent what is good and 
right reason coincide. 
To Galen’s question as to why «pleasure projects a persuasive impression as if it 
were good, and pain a persuasive impression as if it were an evil» (Gal. PHP  V 5, 
320, 18-19), Chrysippus could reply that, although pleasure appears to be good, the 
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